Ending Maoist violence requires military action, and more
While clear data exists to show that left-wing extremism is on the decline, the government must consolidate its recent Bijapur success against the Maoists
On April 2, 13 Maoists were killed in an encounter with the security agencies in the Bijapur district of Bastar division, Chhattisgarh. This has been one of the biggest successes for the security forces in the history of counter-naxal operations. Over the last several years, insurgency-related indices have been on the decline and the success in Bijapur is being viewed as a major setback to Maoists in their last bastion, struggling to maintain their relevance.
In March, the Union home ministry issued a fresh categorisation of the districts affected by Maoism across 10 states — all 38 districts are categorised as Maoist-affected with effect from April 1, 2024, compared to 75 in 2015. Chhattisgarh tops the list with 15 districts. Of these, seven are categorised as “most affected” and all are in the current ground zero of Maoist insurgency, the Bastar division. These districts are Bastar, Dantewada, Bijapur, Narayanpur, Sukma, Kondagaon and Kanker.
As per the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in the first three months of 2024 in Bijapur alone, there have been approximately 33 to 35 incidents related to Maoist violence. Given the above data, it could well be inferred that the insurgency continues to thrive and it may be a bit too early to script its epitaph.
The significant success of April 2 needs to be consolidated, even as a sustainable resolution of the challenge calls for an approach that goes beyond military action.
In January 2024, the chief minister of Chhattisgarh hinted at initiating talks with Maoists and this was reciprocated in affirmation by CPI (Maoist) through a press release dated March 15, subject to application of certain conditions. Although in the background of the April 2 incident, such a proposition is unlikely to gain traction, initiatives on similar lines by the government can offer long-term solutions.
The government's approach is to deal with Maoism in a holistic manner in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception management. This well-thought-out policy warrants equal emphasis on all four prongs. In the context of conflicting narratives emerging from Bastar, it is up to the government to shape the overall milieu.
In order to make inroads into the Maoist-dominated zone, the government has been expanding its security footprints, manifesting in the establishment of camps in the general area. The state government calls them development camps, which are meant to deliver the benefits of welfare schemes to the local population. The local Adivasi population however has enthusiastically welcomed these camps and this does not portend well in terms of trust.
Their point of contention is that Gram Sabhas are not consulted prior to undertaking such measures, which in turn, is a violation of the Constitutional guarantee as per the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (or PESA), 1996. The enduring protest in Silger village on the Sukma-Bijapur border that lasted for more than a year starting in May 2021, was one of the manifestations of such resistance.
The perception among Adivasis is that the primary purpose of projects like the construction of roads is to facilitate the exploitation of their mineral-rich areas. And the Maoists pitch in, resisting these projects by perpetrating violence for their ulterior motives, in the pretence of aligning with Adivasi interests. The perception-building exercise by the government in this regard certainly leaves much to be desired.
Paradoxically, the Adivasi, in whose interests the conflict is going on, has been bearing the brunt. In an operation, when insurgents are killed, Adivasis come under suspicion of Maoists and when the security forces suffer, Adivasis face state scrutiny. To add to his woes is the lack of confidence in the government which drives him into the fold of insurgents, to be led by a non-Adivasi leadership.
Military successes like the one of April 2, need to be consolidated by getting the Adivasi population on board, in line with the third and fourth prong of the government policy. The history of insurgencies is replete with examples that such challenges are at best only controlled and not resolved militarily. With the current state of varied weaknesses of Maoists in terms of shrinking force level, leadership crisis and expanding governance footprints, it is the most suited time to balance the means for desired ends. A permanent end of conflict shall be based on the aspirations of Adivasis who comprise the centre of gravity. It shall indeed be a test of patience, as against knee-jerk declarations of timelines to accomplish targets.
Colonel Shashank Ranjan is a retired Infantry officer with rich experience of serving in counter-insurgency. He teaches war and terrorism as an associate professor of practice at the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana. The views expressed are personal
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