Eye on the Middle East | How China-Saudi defence ties are evolving
With a fresh Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in place between both states since 2022, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is also aligned with China’s BRI.
On June 25, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s defence minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited Beijing, holding meetings with his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun as well as the Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia.
The two sides reportedly agreed to take bilateral military ties to a “higher level”, with the relationship between both armies being on a “fast-track” after multiple exchanges, joint drills and exercises, and personnel training”.
This meeting is only the latest in a number of developments across the last five years that have shown a significant deepening of the Saudi-China relationship. In any case, China’s diplomatic stock in the Middle East grew substantially after it successfully negotiated a rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran in 2023. However, a key marker of the evolution of the relationship has been a fresh effort to expand defence ties.
This is even more so as it is the United States’ defence commitments to the Middle East that continue to be seen as ensuring its dominance as the primary security partner to Arab states such as Saudi Arabia whose economic relationship with China has grown by leaps and bounds; Saudi Arabia’s top imports are from China ($36.5 billion), with USA placed third ($11 billion). With a fresh Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in place between both states since 2022, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is also aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Now, China’s defence forays are aimed at taking advantage not only of US failings in the region but also the inherent desire across Middle Eastern states to diversify and indigenise military imports; note that deep relations with China are a common denominator across the Gulf – including Iran.
Parallel to Bin Salman’s visit, senior military officers from multiple Arab states attended a seminar on “deeper” security cooperation with China. Held as part of the PLA’s International College of Defence Studies’ course on “The Future-oriented Arab-China Security Cooperation”, the course sensitises officers on Arab-China security cooperation as well as China’s Global Security Initiative. Such military interactions between both states have only increased - in October 2023, Saudi Arabia and China launched Exercise Blue Sword 2023 in southern China’s Guangdong province – a counter-terror naval special operations exercise.
Moreover, China remains the front-runner in Saudi Arabia’s quest for a civilian nuclear programme, even as the kingdom holds out hope for a US-led project. These only supplement bilateral economic interactions. While China had announced in 2022 that it looks to buy oil in yuan instead of US dollars, on June 5, Riyadh joined the China-dominated Bank for International Settlements’ cross-border digital currency project — its latest effort in moving from the US dollar.
There is also an indication of growing comfort in Riyadh while it expands ties with China and protects ties with the United States. While the Saudi investment minister stated in June 2023 that in Riyadh’s view, its relationships with China and USA complemented each other, the energy minister asserted a year ago that he “ignores” western criticism of increasing Saudi-China ties because “you will go where opportunity comes your way”.
Note that even as the United States cleared the way for the sale of Patriot missile-defence systems to Saudi Arabia in 2022, it has consistently refused to sell ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, citing Missile Technology Control Regime concerns. This in turn has led Riyadh to develop its own ballistic missiles with Chinese assistance.
The fact that ballistic missiles are now used as part of conventional conflicts, especially by armed non-state actors such as the Iran-backed Houthis, shows that concerns solely related to the nuclear capabilities of ballistic missiles, are outdated as the modern battlefield evolves. This only increases Riyadh’s need to take advantage of Chinese offers and the efficiency of equipment sales.
More importantly, Riyadh continues to stay away from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea, even as Washington tries to increase Riyadh’s stakes in potential diplomatic normalisation with Israel by offering a mutual defence treaty (currently being negotiated). It is this deal that stood out during Antony Blinken’s visit to the kingdom last month (explained here).
With the treaty, Saudi Arabia might become the first non-NATO treaty partner of Washington in the Middle East. However, as Bilal Y Saab has also highlighted – the Saudi-US deal is dependent on the normalisation of ties with Israel which itself is now contingent on the creation of an independent Palestinian state – meaning that if even one leg of this triad fails, the other two fail as well. Even in an optimal geopolitical environment, such an arrangement for a full-fledged mutual defence pact is difficult to imagine as viable (even if agreed upon).
As Chinese arms sales to the Middle East at large crossed 80% between 2013 and 2023, US officials were “quietly” warning Middle Eastern states against purchasing arms from China as it would undermine the US military’s integration with regional partners.
In any case, CENTCOM Commander Michael Kurrilla publicly stated in the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2023 that since Chinese arms sales move much faster (express shipping, financing, no end-user agreements) it hinders integration with US equipment. Hence, even if the cause for the purchase of Chinese arms (the need to diversify) is acceptable to Washington, the effect (operating both US and Chinese equipment) is not. Should Riyadh’s defence ties with Beijing reach critical mass sometime in the future, it is bound to raise unavoidable questions regarding the sale of US arms to Saudi Arabia, and even more so regarding a working defence pact.
What, then, does this portend for geopolitics in the Gulf?
Notwithstanding the myriad changes in the Middle East’s security landscape across the last decade, the consistent presence of US forces, backed by advanced assets and platforms (with one carrier strike group always present in the Northern Indian Ocean) has been the foremost reason for continued US dominance as the main security partner for most Arab states.
The CENTCOM’s position in Bahrain, combined with the US’ long-time defence commitments provides it a large bank of trust and credibility, showing that Washington can commit resources. However, with Israel’s war on Gaza touching nine months and a relentless Houthi campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea, Riyadh is evidently (still) placing its bets on Beijing to weigh on Tehran for a cessation of Houthi attacks on ships headed to (and departing from) Saudi ports.
As the Saudi defence minister reportedly discussed again this with his Chinese counterpart, note that Washington itself has tried leveraging Chinese influence on Iran for the same ends.
A Saudi-US defence treaty is also an awkward endeavour for an administration whose President explicitly committed to making Riyadh a “pariah” on his 2020 campaign trail and actively downgraded the relationship that was achieved in the Trump era, over the last three years.
The Saudi-US relationship was particularly tested when Saudi Arabia not only refused to boost oil production as Russia invaded Ukraine but rather decided to cut production (despite Biden’s personal overtures). Even if both states manage to put this past them, the pact’s inextricable reliance on Israel’s recognition of Palestine at a time when Israeli leaders are drifting farther away from that prospect makes it a distant hope, rather than an immediate expectation, unless Riyadh secures a standalone arrangement.
Hence, even while the US can still retain its strategic ties with Saudi Arabia (with the possibility of further growth under a potential Trump 2.0 administration), China has little to lose and much to gain as it opens up its wares for the kingdom to inspect. In any case, the fact that China has limited defence commitments abroad (which is usually offered as a criticism), might just be Beijing’s asset – allowing it greater flexibility and efficiency at a crucial geopolitical juncture for the Middle East.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a research associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi, and a South Asia Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington DC. The views expressed are personal.