Shajan Skaria v the state of Kerala: A moment to rethink caste-based humiliation

Caste begets a deep sense of repulsion and disgust towards those belonging to another caste, especially if they are considered to be lower in status.

In a recent judgment, Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala, the Supreme Court ruled that ‘mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe’ is not sufficient to warrant an offence under section 3(1) (r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989, ‘unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation’.

Section 3(1)(r) deals with intentionally insulting or intimidating with the intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste in public. . (Representational image only)

Section 3(1)(r) deals with intentionally insulting or intimidating with the intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste in public. The judgment further proposed that in case of derogatory references being made against someone, ‘mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract’ offence under the same section of the 1989 Act.

The interesting interplay of ‘knowing’ and the ‘intention to humiliate’ in this judgement warrants some attention, especially in the context of the deeply hierarchical caste-ordered societies in which these interactions are taking place.

The judgment arises out of a complaint filed by CPI(M) MLA PV Sreenijan against Shajan Skaria, the editor of a Malayalam news portal and YouTube channel, Marunandan Malayalee, under section 3(1) (r), for allegedly making derogatory remarks against him in a video published by the latter. The transcript of the video in question, while alleging financial mismanagement, does not invoke Sreenijan’s caste identity or status in any form.

The judgment argues quite strongly that in the absence of an obvious reference to Sreenijan’s caste identity, a case for humiliation cannot be made under the invoked sections of the 1989 Act. While accepting the legal reasoning of the apex court, it is yet tempting to push for a more expansive and interpretive reading of the law based on a particular statement present in the complaint’s narrative.

In his complaint, Sreenijan argues that by introducing him as an MLA from the Scheduled Caste reserved constituency of Kunnathunad, Skaria invariably invokes his status as a member of the Pulaya community, a Scheduled Caste group. This is an important claim, which asserts that Skaria and his audience were able to identify Sreenijan as a member of the Scheduled Castes because he represents a reserved constituency.

Given the ascriptive nature of caste, it would not be amiss, if the audience were to connect allegations of fraud to Sreenijan’s caste status. In making this claim, Sreenijan is highlighting an important way in which a caste-ordered society, ‘knows’ and enforces caste identities. Knowing someone’s caste does not necessarily depend on a direct invocation of caste identities alone. Caste is often revealed through markers like names, spatial location, occupation, language, food preferences, clothes and most importantly, through an insidious and pervasive way in which knowledge about caste status circulates through codes, whispers, jokes, ascriptions and allegations.

Political scientist, Jadumani Mahanand has thus perceptively argued that the caste discourse has a distinct vocabulary and it is through this language that people are ‘known and treated’. The ‘mere’ knowledge of someone’s caste status, especially if they belong to a marginalised caste, thus has the potential to cascade into more heinous offences even though the obvious invocation of caste identity may not have taken place. The routinised violence and discrimination faced by Dalits is testimony to the fact that knowledge about caste identities is central to the perpetuation of violence.

The Supreme Court has argued that “wherever the legislature intended that mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would be sufficient to constitute an offence under the Act, 1989, it has said so in so many words.” This usage is currently restricted to only a few instances of atrocities in the Act and others such as section 3 (1) (r), are left out of the scope of this interpretation. While the larger context of the Skaria case may not allow for this interpretation, one could use this as an opportunity to push for a more expansive reading of how knowledge about caste identities could provide a trigger for severe forms of caste atrocities and not just the ones indicated in the act.

This also has consequences for how one interprets, ‘the intention to humiliate’, in hierarchical societies such as ours. Caste begets a deep sense of repulsion and disgust towards those belonging to another caste, especially if they are considered to be lower in status. The intention, to cause what V Geetha has called, ‘an ontological wounding’, often lies ensconced within this lack of empathy for the other, provoked ironically by the deep and intimate knowledge of the other. Acknowledging that producing, circulating and possessing knowledge within caste societies is an act of immense power in more than one way, will go a long way in developing measures against the dehumanising effects of humiliation. A more experiential and expansive reading of the law could be the first step towards this end.

Dr. Shivani Kapoor is Coordinator and Associate Professor, Centre for Writing Studies, Office of English and Foreign Languages at O.P. Jindal Global University. The views expressed are personal