From BRICS to BRICS plus: Old partners and new stakeholders

This paper is authored by Harsh V Pant, ORF.

Multilateral institutions reflect the power realities of the time of their inception. As the balance of those power realities change, so too, does their efficacy become a matter of interrogation. Today we are witnessing a rapid evolution in the political order, and every single multi-nation governance platform—from the United Nations (UN) to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)— is facing a crisis of some degree and nature. While the Bretton Woods institutions are struggling to respond to the demands of the present where the post-World War II period is but a faint memory, even those platforms that are of recent vintage, like the SCO, have to come to terms with the new power realities. The BRICS grouping is no exception.

BRICS (AFP)

The Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) emerged in the early 2000s as part of an investment banker’s attempt to understand an unfolding global economic transformation. The leaders of the four nations who clubbed together first as ‘BRIC’—Brazil, Russia, India and China—were quick to capture the zeitgeist of the time as they came together in 2009. The coalition emerged as a political platform eight years after the term was initially coined, when Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and China’s President Hu Jintao accepted an invitation from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to participate in the first BRIC Summit in Yekaterinburg.

The group’s first joint statement declared support for multilateral rule-making in global governance and a multipolar world order, and committed the BRIC countries to a “democratic and transparent decision making and implementation process at […] international financial organisations.” The four leaders committed their nations to the cause of reforming major multilateral institutions to reflect changes in the global economy: “[E]merging and developing economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial institutions.”

This was, in some ways, the beginning of the era of plurilateral talks, where an ad-hoc coalition of countries mobilised themselves around a common demand to seek a redistribution of decision-making authority in economic issues of global import. The second BRIC Summit 2010 in Brasilia was joined by South Africa, which was then admitted as a member, officially adding the ‘S’ to BRIC.

In subsequent years, the BRICS goal of gaining a stronger voice in the international financial system essentially provided the five countries with two possibilities: Challenging global governance versus reforming it. An institutional innovation that could capture both aspirations at the same time was the BRICS development bank, set up at the 2013 Summit in Durban. On one hand, the New Development Bank (NDB), as it was named, can be viewed as a challenger. Member states supported this bank with an initial amount of US$50 billion, thereby creating an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which claimed to have had at that time, $630 billion at its disposal. At the same time, BRICS leaders adopted a framework that allowed the world to see the NDB as just an initiative to democratise global governance by offering and discussing alternatives.

For New Delhi, Russia as an autonomous player was critical in managing China’s growing economic hegemony within BRICS. And there was a time when even New Delhi and Beijing could speak in one voice about global challenges. Today, however, the fault lines within BRICS are getting sharper, with Russia and China trying to pivot the grouping away from its geo-economic orientation to an overtly geopolitical one, as an anti-West platform, even as India and China are increasingly uncomfortable even to find their representatives in one room.

With the ongoing expansion of BRICS membership, a new phase has begun for a grouping that has been searching for a sense of purpose even as a smaller forum of five. Declining mutual trust was beginning to erode its already fragile foundations. Now we are being told that adding six new members this year—Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt and Argentina—with more to follow subsequently would position BRICS as the voice of the Global South. That remains to be seen amid the global turmoil where multilateral institutions are failing and plurilaterals are trying to assert themselves as alternative platforms.

This report highlights the contending claims of key stakeholders in the BRICS as the forum seeks to find a new impetus. For China, as Kalpit A Mankikar points out, groupings like BRICS are key platforms to institutionalise its global leadership. He argues that for China’s top leadership, BRICS “represents a chance to smear the US and present an alternative vision in the hope that it can tap into the grievances with respect to the West among many Global South countries.”

The Russian understanding is articulated by Nivedita Kapoor, who suggests that “understanding the BRICS expansion as a sign of declining western dominance and rise of the non-western world that can resist external pressure, the organisation is broadly seen as having value despite its weaknesses.” She posits that while some might view the lack of a structured organisation or clarity on its values as a weakness, this “is not necessarily seen as an impediment by all given the growing popularity of flexible coalitions in the multilateral arena.”

Hari Seshasayee turns the gaze on Latin America, underlining regional ambivalence “when it comes to multilateral groupings that have even the slightest anti-western leanings.” He argues that “although Brazil, Argentina and perhaps more countries from Latin America could eventually join the BRICS, we can expect them to continue balancing their interests between the West and any BRICS-related initiatives.”

Samir Bhattacharya views the growth of the BRICS as largely boding well for Africa. Though the inclusion of two more African nations—Egypt and Ethiopia—can enhance the voice of the continent in the platform, Samir contends that “some nations are also concerned that western powers may perceive their membership in the BRICS as an attempt to move into an alternative geopolitical bloc or alignment.” Also, important would be the ability of African nations “to put aside their differences and cooperate for an African cause.”

Kabir Taneja looks at the platform through the lens of West Asia—a geography that is now dominating the BRICS with the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. He suggests that for most of these nations, this remains a “short-term geopolitical posturing at minimal risk with hope of potential economic incentives.” He argues that West Asian States would largely aim to use the emerging US-China geopolitical contestation “to extract benefits from both Washington and Beijing while not overtly taking any sides.”

With geopolitical tensions rising and multilateral institutions unable to manage the global flux, platforms such as BRICS will continue to garner global attention. The process of expansion is likely to accelerate further in the coming years given the growing interest in the grouping. Yet as outlined by the authors in this report, the trajectory of BRICS remains an uncertain one at this juncture, with different stakeholders having varied aspirations and expectations. Therein will lie the success or failure of the BRICS. It has come a long way since its inception, but it is still struggling to find a sense of purpose.

The paper can be accessed by clicking here.

This paper is authored by Harsh V Pant, ORF.