Hoax calls: The new threat to the aviation industry
This article is authored by Sabu Sivaraman, airline captain and member, Human Factors Working Group of the Asia Society of Air Accident Investigators, Kuwait.
In the recent past, hundreds of Indian air carriers were subject to hoax bomb threats which necessitated the diversion of many of these flights. In some cases, even fighter jets were scrambled to escort the aircraft to their destinations. Needless to say, this caused immense hardship to the travelling public and severe financial damage to the airlines concerned, besides the embarrassment to the government. This form of attack was something which the industry was not prepared for, and it took everyone by surprise. After the initial shock, many proposals were put forward, some bordering on the bizarre, like the threat to put hoax callers on the No-Fly list, whereas their rightful place should be behind the bars.
One of the objectives of terrorism is to undermine society, causing chaos and a loss of confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and to damage the economy. Aviation is always perceived by terrorists as an attractive target. For example, after the raids on Rome and Vienna airport in 1985, lakhs of American tourists cancelled their holiday trips to Europe thereby damaging both the tourism industry in Europe and the airline industry in America.
Airlines become targets when the countries that they belong to become the target of terrorists. And the method of terrorists keeps changing. Hijacking by terror groups started in the late 60s with the first recorded one in 1968. Now some terror groups have discovered that for attacks not connected with demands like the release of prisoners in an exchange or ransom money, a hijacking or destruction of aircraft is not required. They are able to threaten and cause damage to their ‘enemy’ without taking the trouble of a hijacking which could prove risky to the hijackers too, in case they fail. From the perspective of the terrorists, they have achieved their goals; to cause harm to their opponent. By disrupting the travel plans of thousands, they are not only damaging the tourism industry but also the Indian carriers who are carrying them.
There are a number of ways in which civil aviation can be damaged. Each method demands preventive measures designed exclusively to deter a particular type of attack. A one size fits all approach is not going to serve as a deterrent to those whose sinister design is to wreak havoc on the system. Deploying more sky marshals on flights or threatening to put hoax callers on the No-Fly list is not going to deter someone who has discovered this novel method of inflicting damage to the system. And the presence of sky marshals is not enough deterrent when there are terrorists who are prepared to die.
The faith of the travelling public can only be assuaged by the use of better detection technology, more stringent screening of personnel, better control of passengers and luggage and improved training needed for safeguarding civil aviation facilities. The aim should be to provide security without compromising passenger convenience and efficiency.
A combination of computed tomography (CT) X-ray technology and advanced threat detection algorithms should be deployed to improve the screening process and make it foolproof. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) have been conducting trials on a next generation baggage screening system. The two systems are the existing CT X-ray and the newer X-Ray diffraction (XRD) system. The XRD provides more information about the types of materials in carry-on bags than CT X-ray and, in some cases, can identify what objects are made of. Together the two systems allow security officers to view a 3D image of a bag, identify the materials and any potential threats inside, all without opening the bag. Similarly, sophisticated imaging can be used to scan shoes for explosive materials. A step-on shoe scanner can rapidly form high-contrast images of footwear for analysis by computers to recognise threats. Any shoes flagged with areas of concern can then undergo secondary screening.
The development of countermeasures should adapt with the changing techniques of terror groups. We have to affect changes in strategy to cope with this new form of warfare. Terrorist organisations have the advantage in choosing their methodologies and comprehensive intelligence is the key to prevent attacks. For example, till September 11, 2001 the world did not realise or recognise that terrorists would use hijacked aircraft to wreak destruction. Like any dynamic organisation, terrorism will change every day and terrorists will adopt new tactics to counter the steps taken by the security agencies or airlines. We must be on the lookout for weak spots in our aviation security system and correct them immediately. The goal should be to be proactive and not just reactive. Not only should we develop new techniques to adapt to new threats, but we must continuously update them.
Technology is available to prevent explosive devices from making their way to an aircraft. But there are a number of obstacles to achieving the goal of complete prevention, like cost of equipment, terminal space, training of personnel and passenger convenience. While designing and building airports, passenger handling is normally the only consideration--there is hardly any security input in the design. Shortfalls of this nature enabled the shoe bomber Robert Reid to fashion his shoes to carry explosives and board an aircraft. When he tried to ignite them over the Atlantic Ocean, an alert cabin crew confronted him and with the help of passengers subdued him. So, it was the human element that brought the incident to a safe conclusion and not technology. It is imperative that more attention be paid to the training of the human element as they are the final goal keepers in the entire system.
The latest attacks have only exposed chinks in our armour and the best way to counter is to examine the flaws in our system and take remedial measures. The first step in this direction is to improve the training of all personnel involved. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) mandates that all personnel employed in the aviation industry should undergo a mandatory course in aviation security. The latest incident proves how woefully inadequate the course content is. The whole industry was totally unprepared for such kind of an attack as the course only deals with handling conventional means of attack. The course content is purely theoretical in nature and contains topics like the history of BCAS, the organisational structure of BCAS, venues and dates of various ICAO conventions and names of officers occupying key positions in BCAS. How knowledge of these topics will equip someone to prevent a terror attack is something which only BCAS can explain. There is hardly any case study on this. It is high time that BCAS review their course material and involve those who have an in-depth understanding of aviation security to rearrange their aviation security training.
The authorities should think of innovative strategies to solve the new challenge that the industry is facing now.
This article is authored by Sabu Sivaraman, airline captain and member, Human Factors Working Group of the Asia Society of Air Accident Investigators, Kuwait.