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Bangladesh: Testing India’s South Asia Doctrine

ByArmaan Mathur
Jan 16, 2025 06:10 PM IST

India’s goodwill will also be mortgaged to the presumption that Bangladesh act positively on India’s italicisation of concerns on the treatment of minorities

Bangladesh’s latest demand for Sheikh Hasina’s extradition has illustrated how the country’s political crisis has cemented itself as one of the most pressing quandaries in the complex tapestry of India’s neighbourhood policy. While the external affairs ministry (MEA) has chosen not to comment at the moment, they have confirmed that a “note verbale” has been received from Dhaka requesting the former Bangladeshi PM’s extradition. This newspaper has reported that India is unlikely to accede to the request due to “incomplete formalities” and “political nature of the request”.

Bangladesh’s latest demand for Sheikh Hasina’s extradition has illustrated how the country’s political crisis has cemented itself as one of the most pressing quandaries in the complex tapestry of India’s neighbourhood policy (AP) PREMIUM
Bangladesh’s latest demand for Sheikh Hasina’s extradition has illustrated how the country’s political crisis has cemented itself as one of the most pressing quandaries in the complex tapestry of India’s neighbourhood policy (AP)

Under the India-Bangladesh extradition treaty, Article 8 lists multiple grounds for refusal, including cases in which an accusation has not been “made in good faith in the interests of justice” or military offences which are not “an offence under the general criminal law”. While an exemption on “political grounds” alone might be tough – some of the offences under which Hasina has been booked are excluded from the definition of political crimes in the treaty – it is conceivable for India to decline the request on the grounds outlined.

From a macro lens, what is being tested now is the very nature of India’s engagement in the neighbourhood. In this newspaper, Prashant Jha has earlier contended that the drift of India’s South Asia strategy consists of two plans. “Plan A” rests on “having a friendly regime in power in the vicinity, shaping politics in subtle, and sometimes not-so-subtle, ways to influence a favourable outcome, and using this proximity to address security concerns”. “Plan B” focuses on “maintaining a working relationship with whatever regime is in power, incentivising the regime with the lure of cooperation, showing very clearly the power of the Indian market and economic costs for that country if political or security redlines are crossed, and waiting for the opportune time to nudge domestic political processes in a friendlier direction.” New Delhi’s arc with Maldives under Muizzu is an excellent illustration of the interplay of these two plans. In the case of Bangladesh, India followed Plan A, which has driven the decision to give Hasina refuge in the country. Hasina’s political posturing has since then created a credibility problem for India. She has referred to the Mohammed Yunus-led interim government as “fascist” and “communal”, which, unsurprisingly, drew sharp retorts from Dhaka.

India did not comment on the statements, and it is understandable that it cannot circumscribe Hasina’s freedom of expression. At the same time, these statements make it much more difficult to persuade the new regime in Dhaka of India’s sincerity in the bilateral relationship. This has created a precarious situation where Plan A is not an option anymore, and Plan B is mired in the shadow of Plan A.

Visualising a path ahead requires a context-specific recalibration of India’s engagement strategy in South Asia: a Plan C, which would alter and adopt elements from both A and B. From Plan A, India must currently refrain from “nudging political processes” in any way, given the deepening anti-India sentiment centred on its image to do precisely that. India knows and has done well to articulate both its interests and its concerns: the state of minorities, substantial trade and connectivity links, and the state of democracy in Dhaka.

Foreign secretary Vikram Misri’s recent visit to Dhaka is a case in point. While conveying concerns on the “safety and welfare of minorities”, he reiterated the development side of the “people-centric and people-oriented” India-Bangladesh relationship. The focus was also on the “acknowledgement” of incidents that involved attacks on temples and the Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre.

For Plan B, India needs to add an indication of where it is willing to give in for the sake of the resilience of bilateral ties. In a briefing to the Shashi Tharoor-led Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, Misri added that he informed the interim government of how India’s relation with Bangladesh went beyond “a particular political party” or a particular government. This is significant.

Misri also distanced India from Hasina’s political posturing by mentioning that she used “private communication devices” to make her comments and that the Indian government was not involved in providing her with any platform or facility that enables her to carry out her political activity from Indian soil.

Equally, Dhaka must show Delhi whether it can prioritise the bilateral relationship with an understanding of Delhi’s stance on the issue – treating this as one of the many issues in a multidimensional partnership. De facto Bangladeshi foreign minister Touhid Hossain’s comment mentioning that extradition is “only one of the issues” alongside showing a willingness to “advance with all these issues side by side,” is an encouraging sign.

New Delhi’s continuing goodwill will also be mortgaged to the presumption that Bangladesh will act positively on India’s italicisation of concerns on the treatment of minorities. Here, an important factor that might influence the Bangladeshi side of the ledger is the possible impact of the recent conversation between US NSA Jake Sullivan and Yunus. Washington had already flagged the treatment of minorities in Bangladesh in a statement earlier this month; the recent call saw Sullivan reiterating US support for “a prosperous, stable, and democratic Bangladesh”. As the prospect of a more transactional Trump administration looms, this might or might not continue to be the US line. Yet, the continuing heft of the Indo-US relationship can present this as an opportunity for India to keep an eye on, and if possible, capitalise on.

Strategic caution is naturally going to be the name of the game moving forward. India has done reasonably well in creating partnerships globally – be it expanding engagement in a fraught West Asia, or finding common ground in countering a hegemonic China in the Indo-Pacific. The curse of its neighbourhood, however, continues to be a challenge it has to be both nimble and firm in tackling. A comprehensive plan with space for adaptability and change is its best bet as the fragile situation in Dhaka evolves, and New Delhi seeks to protect its equities.

Armaan Mathur is a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) and a scholar of Indian foreign policy.

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