Section 6A verdict: Reinforcing legislative supremacy on citizenship issues
The judgment is significant as it addresses the historical and legal implications of the Assam Accord.
The Supreme Court verdict affirming the validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, which was enacted as part of the Assam Accord, marks a significant turning point in the ongoing debate over citizenship and demographic change.
By a majority of 4-1, the constitution bench, led by Chief Justice of India Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, upheld Parliament’s authority to legislate on this matter, stating that the cutoff date of March 25, 1971, for conferring citizenship on migrants from Bangladesh was rational and reasonable. Justice Surya Kant, writing a concurring verdict for himself and justices MM Sundresh and Manoj Misra, declared that the Constitution permits Parliament to define different timelines and conditions for citizenship, including state-specific provisions for citizenship when necessary.
The judgment is significant as it addresses not only the historical and legal implications of the Assam Accord but also broader issues of citizenship, constitutional integrity and cultural rights.
Notably, in validating the legal basis of Section 6A while reinforcing parliamentary supremacy in citizenship matters, the verdict might have also strengthened the Centre’s hand in defending the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which aim at granting fast-track citizenship to non-Muslim refugees who came to India on or before December 31, 2014, because of religious persecution in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.
A deep dive into the judgment is imperative for several reasons. The ruling highlights the balance between individual rights and legislative authority in a federal structure while also providing crucial insights into the interplay between historical context and legislative intent, which can serve as a guide for future legal challenges.
Legislative competence of Parliament:
Section 6A is a special provision inserted into the 1955 Citizenship Act on December 7, 1985, based on the Assam Accord -- a tripartite agreement between the then Rajiv Gandhi-led central government, the Assam government and All Assam Students Union (AASU). It came at the end of a six-year-long agitation by AASU to identify and deport illegal immigrants, mostly from neighbouring Bangladesh. The special provision allowed people who entered Assam between January 1, 1966, and March 25, 1971, and who were residing in the state, upon being detected as foreigners, to register themselves as Indian citizens. Upon registration, such people would have the same rights and obligations as a citizen of India but would not be entitled to be included in any electoral roll for 10 years. Those who came prior to January 1, 1966, were granted deemed citizenship.
The petitioners submitted that Parliament did not have the competence to enact Section 6A because the legislative field with respect to granting citizenship is occupied by Articles 6 and 7 and that any alteration of the cut-off date prescribed by these provisions could only be through a constitutional amendment and not by parliamentary legislation. Article 6 covers a limited class of migrants from both Pakistan and Bangladesh (including Assam) who came to India till July 26, 1949. The proviso to Article 7 covered those who remigrated to India from West Pakistan after March 1, 1947, but before July 26, 1949.
Rejecting this argument, justice Chandrachud underscored that Section 6A aligns with the framework provided by Articles 6 and 11 of the Constitution, which grants Parliament the power to legislate on citizenship matters. He held that while Articles 6 and 7 confer citizenship on people migrating from Pakistan, Article 11 gives Parliament broad authority to enact laws regarding citizenship even if they alter the specifics outlined in Part II of the Constitution, which deals with citizenship in Articles 5 to 10.
In his judgment, justice Kant elaborated on this point, While the Constitution comprehensively addresses citizenship through Articles 6 and 7, he pointed out, Article 11 grants Parliament broad powers to enact laws on citizenship, which includes the authority to set different conditions. Therefore, Section 6A does not contravene these articles but complements them by addressing the particular needs of those displaced due to political turmoil.
Reaffirming parliamentary supremacy in legislating citizenship matters, particularly under Article 11 of the Constitution, justice Kant highlighted that the language of this provision fortifies the Parliament’s authority to legislate citizenship conditions even if they diverge from other constitutional provisions. He elucidates that the Parliament’s competence to specify different conditions for citizenship, such as cut-off dates, is well-embedded within Article 11.
“The second important aspect of Article 11, which lends support to this conclusion, is that it grants the Parliament the power to make ‘any’ provision regarding citizenship,” noted justice Kant.
Historical justification:
CJI Chandrachud emphasised the historical and political context that necessitated the Assam Accord, noting that the provision was crafted to address Assam’s unique demographic challenges resulting from cross-border migration during the Bangladesh Liberation War. He pointed out that the provision was intended as a one-time measure to balance Assam’s need for cultural preservation with the humanitarian obligation to accommodate displaced individuals.
Noting that the cut-off date of March 25, 1971, was historically and contextually justified, justice Chandrachud highlighted that the date coincided with Operation Search Light, the Pakistani Army’s action to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in East Pakistan. Prior to this date, migrants were viewed as refugees resulting from partition, for whom India had a more lenient policy. Post this date, however, the context of migration shifted, thereby justifying the legislative distinction, according to the CJI.
“Section 6A was included with the objective of reducing the influx of migrants to India and dealing with those who had already migrated. The Assam Accord was a political solution to the issue of growing migration and Section 6A was a legislative solution. Section 6A is one more statutory intervention in the long list of legislation that balances the humanitarian needs of migrants of Indian Origin and the impact of such migration on economic and cultural needs of Indian states,” he held.
Justice Kant’s judgment also defended the rationale behind the cut-off dates established in Section 6A, noting that the cut-off dates of January 1, 1966, and March 25, 1971, were not arbitrary; they were rooted in significant historical events, including humanitarian considerations and administrative convenience.
“Keeping in mind the humanitarian considerations that would have gone into the grant of citizenship under Section 6A, we cannot hold that the rationale behind the cut-off dates militates against any constitutional values or the concept of constitutional morality. Instead, Section 6A acknowledged the political and social realities of that period along with the impracticability of reversing the changes that had occurred,” he maintained.
Principles of equality under Article 14 and reasonable classification
Both the CJI and justice Kant addressed the concerns under Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law. The petitioners contended that Section 6A is under-inclusive because it confers citizenship only to migrants to Assam. Additionally, they argued, there was no justification to single out Assam to the exclusion of other states that border Bangladesh, like West Bengal, since they all form a homogenous class.
CJI Chandrachud observed that Section 6A’s unique provisions for Assam are justified due to the state’s unique historical and demographic context. He pointed out that Parliament was within its rights to create a distinct framework for Assam under Section 6A, as it falls within a reasonable classification aimed at addressing specific regional needs.
His judgment further stressed that the federal nature of India’s Constitution allows for differential treatment of states when required. Justice Chandrachud maintained that Assam’s demographic and political circumstances made a distinct citizenship framework necessary, aligning with federal principles.
“Conferring citizenship has a rational nexus with the object of the provision since the legislative object of introducing Section 6A was not just to deal with the migration from Assam but to balance it with humanitarian considerations (including conferment of citizenship) for partition refugees,” he declared.
Similarly, justice Kant also addressed concerns under Article 14, stating that the Assam Accord was negotiated specifically with Assam in mind, which justifies the different treatment under Section 6A. He explained that the “intelligible differentia” criterion is satisfied, as Assam’s geographical and historical context is different from other states, necessitating a tailored approach.
Dismissing the petitioners’ contention regarding manifest arbitrariness, the judge asserted that if the norm is backed by a policy reason, the court must refrain from excessively questioning the specific standard and should exercise judicial review cautiously.
Protection of cultural rights and safeguard against external aggression
Article 355 mandates the Union to protect states against external aggression and internal disturbance. The judgment ruled that the provisions of Section 6A did not contravene Article 355, emphasising that the presence of various ethnic groups in Assam does not automatically infringe upon the rights of Assamese cultural identity under Article 29(1). The court highlighted that merely having diverse communities does not hinder one group’s ability to conserve its culture.
As a matter of constitutional principle, the CJI held, the mere presence of different ethnic groups in a State is not sufficient to infringe the right guaranteed by Article 29. He added that various constitutional and legislative provisions protect Assamese cultural heritage, besides the fact that the Constitution provides certain special provisions for the administration of tribal areas in Assam.
Underlining the significance of fraternity, justice Kant, on his part, held that it would have serious consequences if the court were to accept that a mere change in demographics is sufficiently actionable evidence of erosion of rights under Article 29.
“We say so, for the reason that it would undermine the idea of fraternity envisaged by our Constitutional drafters, and bring to life their fears by threatening the cohesion of our diverse nation,” said the judge, adding the same argument could then be made to stop interstate migration under the guise of protecting their indigenous culture.
Justice Kant asserted: “The Constitution of India, and indeed this Court as well, does not envision India as a union of endogamous-homogenous territories. The cascading ramifications of accepting the Petitioners’ stand on federalism and national harmony would be significant, deleterious and not improbable.”
Centre’s position on the CAA 2019 strengthened?
The Supreme Court’s affirmation of Section 6A carries significant implications for the CAA 2019, which seeks to provide citizenship to persecuted non-Muslim minorities from neighbouring countries, specifically those who migrated before December 31, 2014. By upholding the authority of Parliament to legislate on citizenship matters, the ruling has reinforced the Centre’s argument that the CAA is a legitimate exercise of legislative power, designed to address specific humanitarian concerns.
A clutch of over two hundred connected petitions, filed in the top court since 2019, have challenged various CAA provisions, including Section 6B, which aims at granting fast-track citizenship to non-Muslim refugees who came to India because of religious persecution in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan on or before December 31, 2014. The law has been questioned on grounds of religious discrimination against Muslims and arbitrariness.
The constitution bench judgment focus on parliamentary supremacy and establishes a precedent that could bolster the government’s stance on the CAA. Since the CAA, like Section 6A, involves specific conditions for citizenship, the ruling suggests that similar arguments regarding legislative intent and historical context could apply in defence of the CAA. This context positions the CAA as a continuation of the policy framework set out in the Assam Accord and Section 6A. The apex court has further created a precedent that cut-off dates based on political and historical factors can be legally justified by acknowledging the rationale behind Section 6A’s particular duration. This supports the CAA’s timetables as acceptable legislative decisions.
The 6A ruling underlined Parliament’s ability to set diverse conditions for citizenship in specific states is constitutionally sound, especially when dealing with distinct sociopolitical contexts.
The Supreme Court’s rationale for upholding Section 6A addressed the reasonableness of classification under Article 14 of the Constitution, which ensures equality before the law. In the CAA’s case, this reasoning can be applied to defend the law’s religiously specific provisions, as it is argued that non-Muslim refugees from the specified countries face distinctive risks due to their religious minority status. The CAA can thus be framed as a legitimate exercise of Parliament’s power to create laws that address specific humanitarian and sociopolitical needs.
As the political and social landscape around citizenship and migration evolves, the principles outlined in this ruling will likely shape future debates and legal challenges related to India’s citizenship laws, potentially informing policies on both humanitarian grounds and regional needs.
