Behind Iran’s restraint in West Asia conflict
Iran’s missile barrage into Israel on October 1 failed to reverse Israeli escalation in Lebanon and invited a direct response against Iran
On November 27, a 60-day ceasefire deal between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel, brokered by the United States (US) and supported by France, came into effect. From late September, the exchange of fire between Hezbollah and Israel had rapidly escalated. Over the next two months, Israel relied heavily on airstrikes that targeted several high-level leaders, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s arsenal, launching sites, and strategic crossings along the Lebanese-Syrian border to degrade Hezbollah.
Iran’s missile barrage into Israel on October 1, stated to be a reprisal against the killing of Nasrallah and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, failed to reverse Israeli escalation in Lebanon and invited a direct response against Iran. Iran’s two largely demonstrative strikes against Israel and lack of active support for Hezbollah indicate a restraint that has surprised many.
However, Iran’s conduct during the conflict, including support for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, is shaped by its defence strategy and constraints of regional geopolitics.
Since the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, Iran bolstered Hezbollah’s stockpile of drones and rockets, calculating that the group’s forward strike capabilities will serve as deterrent against Israel. Over the last year, both Iran and Hezbollah followed an intentional escalation management strategy under which they absorbed losses to avoid a full-scale war with Israel.
Iran’s “axis of resistance”, including Hezbollah and Hamas, was meant to serve the limited purpose of defensive deterrence. They were not to be sacrificed by getting involved in a full-blown conflict with Israel, let alone dragging Iran into a direct conflict with Israel. Instead, to bolster the axis, Iran had supported “unity of fronts” — Hezbollah opening a northern front, and Houthis attacking Red Sea shipping and Israel’s southern ports to force a ceasefire in Gaza. However, Israel leveraged its superior intelligence capabilities, air power and US backing to force a ceasefire, delinking the Lebanon and Gaza fronts. The weakening of Hezbollah not only leaves Iran vulnerable to Israeli attacks, but also has ripple effects across the entire axis, as seen in the Turkish-backed Jihadists’ offensive in Syria.
Iran’s apparent restraint is also explained by regional conditions. Since October last year, Iran has mounted a regional diplomatic campaign mobilising support for a ceasefire in Gaza and a united Islamic voice against Israel. While pushing back against the US-backed diplomatic normalisation between Israel and Gulf States, Iran’s intensified regional diplomacy has been about keeping its own rapprochement with Riyadh and other Arab capitals alive.
The sheer number of countries in the region that participated in the Israeli air defence against the Iranian aerial attack in April left little doubt in Tehran that any overt escalation ran the risk of driving its Gulf neighbours closer to Israel. The multiple regional tours by Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araqchi and his predecessor have relayed the message that Iran does not seek expansion of the conflict. Tehran has also sought assurances that nations in the region will not facilitate hostile action against it by Israel and the US. At a time when Israel has asserted its military dominance and the incoming Trump administration has indicated a renewed pressure campaign against Iran, Iran appears to have doubled down on diplomacy.
While making new overtures to the West on the nuclear issue, it has also renewed calls for a new regional arrangement in the Persian Gulf that will reduce reliance on the US and encourage stakeholders to address conflicts through dispute resolution mechanisms. Iran’s hope from this approach is that its Gulf neighbours will seek to avoid a repeat of the regional insecurity that followed Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and counsel him against intensifying “maximum pressure” against Iran.
Deepika Saraswat is associate fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views expressed are personal
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