Dangers of conflict with China at LAC are rising

Both sides have shown a high degree of restraint in not using firearms, but there are limits to self-control when a soldier sees his comrade being bludgeoned with a club.

News broke last week of a clash between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on December 9 at Yangtse in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh. The defence minister made a brief statement in Parliament, acknowledging the incident had taken place when PLA troops tried to transgress the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and “unilaterally change the status quo.” There was a physical scuffle resulting in injuries to a few personnel on both sides, but the “Indian Army bravely prevented PLA from transgressing into our territory and compelled them to return to their posts”, the minister added. The matter appears to have been resolved with a flag meeting between local commanders.

What is becoming evident is that China is prepared to use military force to change the status quo along LAC. The Indian military, too, is determined to thwart PLA actions and is ready to use force when required. (AFP)

Yangtse is considered a “disputed area”, and face-offs in this area generally occur each year. The last intrusion attempt by PLA happened in September 2021, when the Chinese troops were similarly repulsed. However, the current attempt is different from a routine patrol activity, as claimed by the spokesperson for PLA’s Western Theatre Command. Hundreds of soldiers moving across LAC during the hours of darkness and attempting to occupy positions is more akin to an attack than a patrol.

As is usual, China sought to downplay the incident and blamed the Indian Army for blocking a regular patrol on “the Chinese side of LAC” after illegally crossing LAC. This has become a recurring Chinese narrative that finds no takers on the Indian side. Army chief General Manoj Pande has clearly stated, “We all know what the Chinese say, and what they do is quite different. It is also a part of their nature and character. We need to focus on their actions rather than what is on their texts or scripts or their articulation.”

The timing of the Yangtse incident has been linked to different events — India’s presidency of the G20, the US-India military exercises close to LAC, China’s internal dissent over the zero-Covid policy among them. But, whatever the reason, what is becoming increasingly evident is that China is prepared to use military force to change the status quo along LAC. In response, the Indian military is determined to thwart PLA actions and is equally ready to use force where required.

This makes for a volatile and tense situation exacerbated by the breakdown of agreements and protocols that had kept peace along LAC for decades. Although there is sometimes a reference to “structured mechanisms to restore peace and tranquillity,” these will not work in an environment where there is an almost complete absence of trust. And trust has been the biggest casualty of the 2020 Galwan clash.

There is a real danger of physical clashes escalating to a localised conflict. Both sides have shown a high degree of restraint in not using firearms, but there are limits to self-control when a soldier sees his comrade being bludgeoned with a club. As a recently released video shows, when these face-offs occur, there is no gentle pushing and shoving but an almost medieval, violent contest for domination. This means that the Indian Army faces a situation along the complete LAC that is characterised by unpredictability and calls for a very high level of readiness. The additional troops that were deployed after the 2020 standoff are unlikely to be withdrawn, even if there is some limited disengagement in Eastern Ladakh. Building infrastructure to support the soldiers in this inhospitable terrain will also require adequate budgetary support.

The onus is on China to curtail its aggressive behaviour along LAC. However, as political scientist John Mearsheimer recently pointed out, China has two sets of reasons to be aggressive. First, China wishes to become a regional hegemon in Asia, and second, they want to settle the border dispute with India on their own terms. Therefore, India should not hope for a restoration of the status quo ante or a return to the pre-2020 modus vivendi on LAC.

These are realities that must be faced. The actions by PLA along LAC are only a manifestation of China’s larger geopolitical ambitions to play a dominant role in Asia and global affairs, and weaken regional competitors such as India. While officers and soldiers will rise to the military challenges, as they have always done, there is also a need to adopt a long-term coherent national approach.

In this context, it is disheartening to see political bickering over the Yangtse incident. This underscores the need for quiet communication between the government and the opposition on national security matters. Constant public attacks on the government, accusing it of weakness, serve little purpose. While all political parties profess solidarity with the Indian soldier, they could best help him by adopting a bipartisan approach to deal with a rising and aggressive China.

Lieutenant-General (retired) Deependra Singh Hooda is the co-founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research and a senior fellow, Delhi Policy Group

The views expressed are personal