Geopolitics reigned supreme this year

There is a symbiotic link between a country’s successful foreign and security policy and its trade and investment strategy

Covid-19 has made sure that it is neither possible to look at 2021 with any measure of satisfaction nor look forward to 2022 with any degree of optimism. In an ideal world, a global pandemic should have brought all countries together. Instead, it has left countries divided, selfish, and inward-looking. At the end of the day, geopolitics reigned supreme in 2021.

The fact is that India in 2021 still did a lot more balancing than leading. But balancing it did with some finesse (Wikimedia Commons)

The global strategic landscape was largely defined by the friction between the United States (US) and China. It is impossible to determine who got the better of whom in a serious war of attrition that is still ongoing, but a fair conclusion is that both countries stood greatly diminished in stature. The US may be in relative decline, but China continues to be a mere pretender to the throne. Both the US and China are beset with serious internal problems, but the inherent resilience of the American society may prove to be superior to the authoritarian rigidity of the Chinese system in the long run. In the meantime, a modus vivendi between the two powers is proving elusive, with adverse consequences for cooperation on global challenges such as the climate crisis, nuclear non-proliferation, and counterterrorism.

Russia has successfully reinserted itself into great power politics by insisting on strategic parity with the US. By designating Ukraine as a core national interest and establishing clear red lines vis-à-vis the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia has thrown down the gauntlet to the West. The US appears to have accepted the enormity of the Russia challenge, hence, the joint establishment of an “integrated bilateral strategic stability dialogue” between the two countries which is expected to be “deliberate and robust”. The outcome of this dialogue though is anyone’s guess.

It is easy to say that the European Union (EU) is muddling along, but that may be a tad unfair. The EU has shed the United Kingdom (UK) without too much fuss, has recalibrated its fraught relationship with China, resuscitated its transatlantic ties, and continued its international leadership on issues such as the climate crisis and digital transformation.

The EU has also, somewhat ambitiously, launched the “Global Gateway” strategy, which seeks to rival the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative by boosting smart, clean, and secure links in digital, energy, and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education, and research systems across the world. The EU is backing this up with a pledge to mobilise 300 billion euros of investments between 2021 and 2027. The “Strategic Compass” launched by the EU aims to cement the foundations for a shared vision for European security and defence among its member states. It is a work in progress, and there is a long way to go before Europe has an effective security deterrence. The hope is that the EU’s objective to operationalise “strategic autonomy” enables it to become an indispensable and strong pole in a multipolar world.

So, how does all this sit with India and its stated ambition to go from being a balancing power to a leading power? The fact is that India in 2021 still did a lot more balancing than leading. But balancing it did with some finesse. A few examples will help illustrate this. While our strategic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and some Gulf countries have moved into top gear, we also participated in the significant meeting of the “other Quad” namely, the one between India, Israel, the UAE and the US. India also participated with equal ease in summit meetings of “Quad” (the US, Japan, Australia, and India) as with those of the RIC (Russia, India and China). India stuck to its guns, or S-400 Missiles in this case, with Russia. It was also significant that India and France conducted joint patrols in the Reunion Island of the Indian Ocean, something India was loathe to do with other strategic partners.

While the art of strategic hedging and supreme balancing was evident in India’s foreign and security policy, it is less clear to what extent India was able to shape events. China and its actions in Ladakh dominated the threat landscape for India. The impact on bilateral ties was palpable. But China has steadfastly refused to restore the status quo ante on the border and this is something that must hitherto inform our overall policy on China. Occupying Kailash heights was an attempt to shape events and there is a similar need to think out of the box when it comes to China. In the meantime, India must resist at the border and thwart the “nibble and gobble” strategy of China.

There is a symbiotic link between a country’s successful foreign and security policy and its trade and investment strategy. India is no exception to this cardinal rule. Two challenges await India in this regard. First, India needs to grow at 8% to 9% Gross Domestic Product for the next 10 years so that the 400 million or so of its citizens who live in multidimensional poverty can be lifted out of their misery. Second, while we have ambitiously launched a flurry of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the EU, the UK, Australia, Canada, the UAE, Israel and so on, India will need to carry out difficult economic reforms at home so that we can benefit from the FTAs when they are eventually concluded. These two constitute the most difficult tasks faced by India in 2022.

Mohan Kumar is dean/professor at OP Jindal Global University and a former ambassador

The views expressed are personal