Grand Strategy | The new template for dialogue with Pakistan
A clinical minimalism focussed on conflict management appears to define New Delhi’s engagement with Islamabad
External affairs minister S Jaishankar’s recent visit to Islamabad for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting was noticeably free of the usual acrimony between India and Pakistan. This warmth, singularly generated by the absence of acrimony, has raised hopes for a new dialogue process. However, this optimism, in my opinion, may be misplaced — the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government appears to have little appetite to initiate a comprehensive dialogue process with Pakistan. The age of unlimited optimism in India-Pakistan relations is long over — a new template of clinical minimalism has emerged, which might characterise the relationship going forward.
Between 2004 and 2008, the relationship between India and Pakistan was marked by a comprehensive dialogue process. Both sides displayed strong political will to address core issues, particularly the Kashmir conflict and terrorism, through open diplomacy as well as dedicated backchannels that reported directly to then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf who, in turn, were passionate about building peace. This period also witnessed enthusiastic people-to-people exchanges, bilateral media engagement and attention, and the implementation of several confidence-building measures. Unfortunately, this came to a grinding halt after the terror strike on the Indian embassy in Kabul and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. That ended the golden age of Indo-Pak ties.
Today, we have a new template. This template for dialogue between India and Pakistan emerged in February 2021, characterised by discreet, clinical, businesslike communication between India’s national security adviser and the Pakistan army chief, or their trusted interlocutors, which reportedly bypassed the civilian government in Islamabad. Unlike the earlier format’s objective of conflict resolution, the new format is focused on conflict management, partly because the process came into being in the violent phase following the tense aftermath of India’s 2019 decision to abrogate the Constitution’s Article 370 that defined the relationship between the Union and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
The February 2021 ceasefire agreement between the two militaries, which resulted from discreet backchannel talks, has successfully maintained calm along the Line of Control (LoC) for over three years. The bilateral relationship has since been marked by periodic, clinical, low-profile operational exchanges between security officials, with no visible political engagement or appetite thereof.
For the BJP-led government in India, this new template offers several significant advantages. Considering the uncertainty about the outcomes of the India-Pakistan peace processes, New Delhi today sees little value in entering politically sensitive negotiations with Pakistan. While the comprehensive dialogue from 2004 to 2008 ultimately failed to make progress on the Kashmir issue or other outstanding issues such as Siachen or Sir Creek, the discreet engagement since 2021 has delivered tangible results. Consider for instance the fact that violence in J&K has decreased, and intermittent conversations between the two security establishments have ensured that tensions along the LoC in J&K remain under control. New Delhi, therefore, appears satisfied with the outcomes of this clinical approach.
There is also no overwhelmingly supportive public sentiment in India for a peace process with Pakistan, unlike between 2004 and 2007, when such efforts had immense popular support. Even if public sentiment could be altered by the political class, the current government appears to lack the political appetite to initiate talks with Pakistan. Moreover, New Delhi is busy with more pressing strategic priorities, such as managing the Indo-Pacific region, addressing the structural challenges posed by China, dealing with a restive South Asia, and maintaining its relationships with the West in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Relations with Pakistan, in this scheme of things, occupy low priority.
For New Delhi, the success of this new template means that a formal political dialogue with Pakistan is unnecessary, at least for now. In this context, in a statement on August 30, 2024, Jaishankar made three arguments pertaining to India’s relations with Pakistan: One, he said, “I think the era of uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan is over. Actions have consequences.” Two, “In so far as Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, Article 370 is done. So, the issue today is what kind of relationship can we possibly contemplate with Pakistan.” Three, “We are not passive. Whether events take a positive or a negative direction, either way we will react”, Jaishankar added.
Put differently, from New Delhi’s perspective, the conflict in Kashmir has been fundamentally transformed, and there is little reason to engage Pakistan in dialogue over this as it is an internal issue for India. India further believes that a non-stop dialogue with Pakistan is unnecessary and that it can live with a less-than-perfect relationship with Pakistan. Moreover, the government reserves the right to respond firmly if Pakistan fails to curb terrorism or attempts to disrupt peace in J&K; and it will also respond positively to positive overtures from Pakistan.
Indian strategic analysts also believe that the new template has enabled India to focus on its larger strategic goals in the region and beyond. Going back to the old format, by that logic, would divert India’s attention from more pressing issues. For now, therefore, conflict management rather than conflict resolution remains the guiding principle of India’s Pakistan policy.
Finally, going back to the old template, Delhi also appears to believe, would require it to give up some of the unexpected gains from the new template. For instance, over the past five years or so, India has unilaterally changed the terms of engagement on J&K in which it is unwilling to discuss issues internal to the state such as Article 370 and local politics with Pakistan limiting the conversation to measures for reducing violence. Going back to a comprehensive dialogue, Delhi worries would reopen some of these new realities Delhi is uncomfortable with.
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research. The views expressed are personal
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