Grand Strategy | The Trump inflection on US foreign policy
Unless his second term differs dramatically from the first, we can expect a mostly disinterested and extractive approach to global engagement by Washington.
Donald Trump’s stunning return to the presidency of the United States (US) will have significant implications for international politics. Unless his second term differs dramatically from the first, which is unlikely, we can expect a sharply interest-based, mostly disinterested and extractive approach to global engagement by Washington.
One of the key features of American foreign policy during Trump’s first term in office was transactionalism — a “mercantile” approach. Under Trump 2.0, this policy — essentially to safeguard clear and direct American interests — rather than pursuing esoteric goals such as democracy or values promotion is likely to continue. All American administrations engage the world to safeguard their interests, but the traditional logic was that the US must create a stable world as it is easier to pursue American interests in such a world. In Trump’s view of the world, however, the traditional American thinking that US interests are better served in a more orderly world, and therefore, Washington DC must persevere on global stability, holds little value. It is not that America’s “moral” crusades are widely liked, but the most powerful country showing little interest in running the world could lead to unpredictable outcomes in global politics. We must watch out for what such unpredictability brings with it.
The second direct implication of Trump 2.0 is the securitisation of European geopolitics. For Europe, an undependable Trump, who is highly unlikely to go after Vladimir Putin, poses existential challenges. Thanks to Trump’s argument that Americans should not spend taxpayer money to defend Europe, Europeans have already been looking for ways to defend themselves. Increased defence spending, expanded security arrangements, and more interests-based engagement with the world by Europeans would not only securitise European geopolitics but also push Europe’s moral impulses onto the back burner. For the first time since the end of World War II, Europeans will develop their own military strategies, spend more on defence, and go back to the hard business of geopolitics.
Not only could ethical considerations take a backseat in Europe’s engagement with the world, but its long-held assumptions about the relationship between security and trade may also be upended. The fast-emerging logic in mainland Europe is that there can be no prosperity without security. Europe’s security-first policy has the potential to bring it closer to India.
The already feeble multilateralism — the United Nations (UN) and its related institutions, organisations, and regimes — may face growing irrelevance under Trump 2.0. Trump’s promise to impose massive tariffs on Chinese imports into the US will further strengthen de-globalisation impulses worldwide, something New Delhi and other emerging economies might not be in favour of.
A Trump presidency is likely to target China with short-term measures but may lack the sustained and patient focus it takes to counter Beijing’s long game of reshaping the world order in its favour. With the US under Trump showing diminished interest in running the world, a power vacuum is bound to emerge, one that China is only too eager to fill. Moreover, Trump’s flippant stances on security assurances for regional allies like South Korea and Japan could also lead to instability and security dilemmas in Southeast Asia, triggering nuclear proliferation concerns. Ultimately, therefore, with a disinterested and retrenched US, an ineffective UN, and an ignored Global South, China stands to gain the most from Trump-led America’s retreat from global leadership.
The return of Trump to the White House could present India with a mix of tactical relief, medium-term constraints, and long-term strategic dilemmas. In the short term, India could face less pressure from the US on human rights issues and less scrutiny regarding Canada’s accusations against India even as the American legal process in this context may continue. But then, India is more concerned about political pressure than the legal process, at least for the moment. Trump 2.0 may exert reduced or no pressure on India to align with the US stance on Ukraine or limit its continuing dealings with Russia.
Trump’s return and the ensuing global instability could also be an opportunity for India to pursue its interests more decisively using the tools of multi-alignment — unless, of course, Trump takes issue with India’s independent stance on specific issues. What really worries New Delhi is Trump’s possible stance on Indian tariffs on US imports, which could impact trade relations, with potential spillover into other domains. Trump 2.0 may also have a paradoxical effect on India’s policy of strategic autonomy. On the one hand, Trump’s reduced global engagement could give India greater room to practise strategic autonomy and multi-alignment more proactively. On the other, if Washington pressures New Delhi to “play ball” in a polarised world, it could limit the latter’s ability to balance competing coalitions effectively.
If Trump manages to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Ukraine war or end the war one way or another, it could reduce Russia’s dependency on China, thereby allowing Russia to assert and pursue its interests in its strategic periphery, including in Central Asia and parts of South Asia, opening pathways of increased collaboration between Russia and India, thereby potentially checking the stupendous rise of China in their neighbourhoods.
But foreign policy is also personal. Therefore, New Delhi will do well to differentiate between American foreign policy interests and Trump’s personal ego, treating them as separate entities requiring customised outreach. India should strengthen ties with the US security establishment, engage the new stars on Capitol Hill, get the Indian diaspora to advance India’s interests, and prepare for the long-term fallouts of Trump 2.0.
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research. The views expressed are personal
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