Grand Strategy | Time for a new neighbourhood policy
By reaching out to the Taliban and the Myanmar junta, India has demonstrated an ability to have a non-ideological approach to regional policy.
There is a growing, and legitimate, concern in India today that its neighbourhood is becoming increasingly hostile. The recent events in Bangladesh, following last year’s ‘India Out’ campaign in Maldives, have intensified this belief. India has ample reason for concern, as it has historically held a dominant position in the region. More so, regional geopolitics is bound to influence India’s ability to rise as a global power.
This pushback is a function of both domestic political dynamics in these countries and the changing structure of the regional balance of power. While India’s historical and contemporary relations with these nations have undoubtedly contributed to such pushback, it would be inaccurate to attribute the rise in anti-India sentiment solely to New Delhi’s actions. It's far more complicated. In any case, this is not the first time New Delhi has had to deal with anti-India sentiments in the region.
And yet, considering the domestic and regional changes afoot in the region, India must craft new strategies to engage the region.
First and foremost, it is simply not possible for India and any other regional or global actor to control or micro-manage the region’s domestic politics; it is neither possible nor desirable. In fact, the growing complaint in the Indian strategic community that ‘we can’t control our neighbourhood’ smacks of an imperial mindset. India’s traditional form of primacy in the region is a thing of the past, and so it must find ways to ‘modernise’ its influence to make it more palatable to the region.
In that sense, it is both futile and counterproductive to try to ‘control’ the region and its politics. The most effective approach would be to shape the incentive structure within which regional states operate and formulate their policies: Influence works best when it operates subtly and without being overtly felt. For instance, instead of being miffed about the anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh, New Delhi must incentivise the new establishment in Dhaka to work with India.
The second policy shift is to accept the emerging realities and work to shape them rather than refusing to acknowledge them. Denial of political changes in the region—whether in Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, or the Maldives—serves no purpose, as these changes will occur regardless of our preferences. In foreign policy praxis, denial is not an effective tool, nor is complaining a viable strategy for states.
We must also come to terms with the structural shifts underway in the regional balance of power, particularly the reality that regional states will increasingly turn to China to counterbalance India's traditional primacy. Closing our eyes and refusing to accept the rise of China in the region will only bring more darkness to our vision. One of the major errors that states make in their foreign policies is to mistake what is desirable for what is inevitable.
Thirdly, just as it makes little sense to lament that we are unable to ‘control’ the political outcomes in the regional states, it is equally erroneous to argue that we are somehow responsible for the internal developments in our neighbouring countries. Not everything that happens in our neighbouring countries is a reflection us, and not all adverse developments signify our failure. Our neighbours have their unique political lives, as complicated as ours, sometimes more. Attempting to change course of domestic political outcomes in the region is a fool’s errand at best, and a strategic error, at worst.
While anti-India feelings in the neighbourhood should certainly worry us, let’s keep in mind that sometimes India just serves as a useful political scapegoat, an object of ready-made conspiracies, and some people may even experience a collective catharsis in calling India names. We must learn to take it in our stride; major powers routinely get name-called, and that’s normal.
Fourth, anticipating political and geopolitical outcomes is a major part of statecraft and diplomacy. If so, we must introspect the reasons why we are unable to anticipate political changes in the region. Is it because we invest in certain individuals and parties that we are unable to imagine and be ready for scenarios beyond them?
Our preferences or friendships should not lead us to mistake what is desirable for what is inevitable. Playing favourites in our neighbouring countries is a bad strategy due to the inherent uncertainty of domestic politics; today’s favourites could become tomorrow’s adversary and vice versa. Moreover, politicians in our neighbourhood often deliberately involve India in their internal power struggles to gain domestic political advantages. Nepali politicians, for instance, have a long history of using India as a tool in their domestic political manoeuvres.
Finally, our domestic political impulses shouldn’t be allowed to influence our foreign policies. More or less, we have managed to do that. In fact, by reaching out to the Taliban and the Myanmar junta, India has demonstrated an ability to have a non-ideological approach to regional policy. This policy must be continued towards countries such as Bangladesh as well. If we are able to do business with the Taliban or even the Pakistani military for that matter, nothing should stop us from engaging Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.
In its journey towards becoming a global power, New Delhi cannot afford to ignore its neighbourhood. It must, therefore, devise innovative ways of dealing with a restive region fraught with domestic political uncertainties and geopolitical contestations.
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research. The views expressed are personal
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