Living with China, with tempered expectations
The thaw in bilateral relations is welcome. India will have to continue to show strategic patience and reduce dependencies on China through economic de-risking
On Monday, October 21, the foreign secretary stated at a media briefing that an “agreement has been arrived at on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020”. The minister of external affairs (EAM) confirmed the understanding later in the day and added, “we have gone back to where the situation was in 2020. We can say that the disengagement process with China has been completed”. The next day, the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson also remarked that “China and India have reached resolutions on issues concerning the border area”.
Any restoration of the status quo as of early 2020 in eastern Ladakh would be a major breakthrough and a significant gain for Indian diplomacy. However, with details not yet made public, there are more questions than answers.
First, media reports suggest that Indian forces will be able to resume patrolling to patrolling points (PPs) in the Depsang Plains they were visiting until early 2020. Does this include access to five PPs beyond the Y-junction where Indian troops were being blocked? In Demchok, will our forces patrol up to the junction of Nilung Nala and Charding Nala? How far will the Chinese patrols come in these two areas? Will there be overlapping or coordinated patrolling? Second, what happens to the “buffer zones” that were agreed upon earlier — in Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Gogra, and Pangong Lake area? Do we resume patrolling to the PPs we were visiting earlier? (Now, reports suggest that the latest understanding is limited to Depsang and Demchok.) Third, what about our graziers getting access to the pastures they were using traditionally? Finally, we linked the return of normalcy in overall relations with China to the restoration of normalcy in the border areas. How will it play out now? Does the normalisation of borders include both the resumption of patrolling and the de-escalation of the military situation?
The Chief of Army Staff reiterated on Tuesday that “we want to go back to the status quo of April 2020” and that disengagement, de-escalation and normal management of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) would follow as we restore trust. He referred to the two sides as “not creeping” into the buffer zones. However, buffer zones did not exist in April 2020 and if they are maintained, there will be no restoration of the April 2020 status quo, which the Army chief has rightly flagged as our objective.
The Chinese are looking at the management of the borders through the prism of sovereignty. The way status quo in eastern Ladakh was altered by the Chinese forces in the summer of 2020 has major territorial implications for India, and, therefore, there must be greater transparency on the agreement reached with China.
Speaking on September 12, the EAM referred to the progress in sorting out “disengagement problems” with China but underlined the “bigger issue” of the increasing militarisation of the border. Looking ahead, the process of de-escalation and de-induction of forces will receive the attention of the two sides. Our negotiators will no doubt bear in mind that India is at a serious disadvantage when it comes to the re-induction of forces.
This was pointed out to the Chinese side in the talks leading to the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field signed on November 29, 1996. Article III (3) of the Agreement provides that the ceilings on military forces and armaments within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC “shall be determined in conformity with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security, with due consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of the terrain, road communication, and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments”.
Now that an understanding of the resumption of patrolling in eastern Ladakh has been reached, the question arises of a reset in bilateral relations. India will be well advised to exercise caution in this regard.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the margins of the Brics summit in Kazan, where a process of re-engagement was agreed upon. India should step up communication with China without letting the guard down.
While it is in our interest to bring down tensions along the borders, we cannot lose sight of the fact that Chinese troops pivoted after what was seen as a routine military exercise off eastern Ladakh during April-May 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic and transgressed the LAC at multiple locations.
Structural problems in the relationship that predated Galwan haven’t gone away. Indeed, they have become more acute. Prior to the pandemic and developments in eastern Ladakh, India had sought constructive engagement with China and progress was made in some areas. However, in parallel, outstanding issues in the relationship were accumulating. Border stand-offs were becoming more frequent, with China showing little interest in either clarifying the LAC or moving towards a boundary settlement. The world views of India and China were becoming increasingly divergent. China was looking at India through the prism of its strategic contestation with the United States (US).
There was a growing feeling in India that China was not supportive of the rise of India. Bilateral trade was becoming more and more asymmetrical. In 2023, India’s bilateral trade deficit crossed $105 billion, with unhealthy dependencies on China for key imports.
None of this has changed. China is still seen as undermining India’s vital security and strategic interests in the shared periphery. It pays lip service to multipolarity but seeks a unipolar Asia dominated by it.
China is facing geopolitical pushback and economic headwinds and is more inclined to show tactical flexibility in its dealings with the US, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and now India. We also can do with greater elbow room while seeking strategic autonomy amidst some anxieties in relations with the US.
Yet, India will have to continue to show strategic patience, learn to live with a sensitive border with China, step up investment in border infrastructure, reinforce conventional and strategic deterrence, continue with the posture of external balancing without any exaggerated expectations, and reduce its dependencies on China through a difficult process of economic de-risking, even while exploring openings for cooperation. China will remain India’s principal strategic challenge, and a hasty return to business as usual will be ill-advised.
Ashok K Kantha is a former ambassador to China. The views expressed are personal
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