The churn in Europe is the big story of the Ukraine war
Western regathering has meant that Putin’s war has carried over into a second year. It will intensify in the coming months, and cause further upscaling of western military assistance to Ukraine. The continent will feel a security pinch as a result
Recall the second half of 2021. Dramatic visuals from Afghanistan and the French outcry over the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) grouping renewed the global impression that the West lacked coherence as a geopolitical unit. It had the capabilities to act as one — as its military-logistical might during the Kabul airlift amply displayed — but political differences, apparent intelligence failure over the balance between the Taliban and the Ashraf Ghani regime, and the ruthlessness of the Anglosphere countries towards the French were seen as latest signs that the grouping was adrift and in decline. It is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin bought wholesale this popular reading of western disarray as his forces prepared to invade Ukraine. But it is almost certain that he thought the West was fissured enough to not derail his plans to decapitate Ukraine’s government and make the country subservient to Russia. He was wrong.
The regathering of the West as a coherent geopolitical force is the big story of the war. The process was kickstarted by two developments: The accuracy of Anglo-American intelligence, which determined an invasion was in the offing weeks before it actually began; and the swiftness with which coordinated and comprehensive sanctions were imposed on Russia by the West. Three lines of development tell the subsequent story.
First, the re-emergence of the US as the leader of the West after the inertia of the Barack Obama and the dangerous recoiling of the Donald Trump years. Joe Biden’s America has reverted to acting like a great power, staying focused on the behaviour of rivals China and Russia. Ensuring bipartisan support and disciplining myopic progressives within the Democratic party, the Biden administration has provided staggering, and by far the largest, sums in military and other assistance to Ukraine and other European countries facing the consequences of the invasion. It has kept Ukraine in the game, shored up European security, and elbowed the Europeans towards a comprehensive reorientation of their security architecture while bringing together its global allies — Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Japan — on the same page over Ukraine. America’s return as a great power should stabilise strategic equations across Asia and the Indo-Pacific, where China has loomed large.
Second, the war has set off a deep churn in European affairs that will continue for years. Casting off dependence on Russian energy and managing the cost of living and the refugee crises were only the first set of challenges for the European Union and European States, where they have done reasonably well. Their biggest challenge is to accept the reality that geopolitics is back on the continent and they are running against time in their race to become security self-dependent. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) will expand as Finland and Sweden — Turkey’s roadblocks notwithstanding — are set to join the alliance. Europe’s eastern flank comprising the Bucharest 9, which faces Russia’s heat, is being militarily reinforced. But the key requirement is a profound reorientation of Germany as a State and society.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has rightly described the invasion as heralding a Zeitenwende — epochal tectonic shift — in European affairs and accepted the need for Germany to become the guarantor of European security. But its armed forces are in an appalling state. Its society remains circumspect about rearming the country, given the guilt and memory of World War II. And its coalitional political system consumes a lot of time, which the country does not have, to produce the major security decisions it urgently needs.
There is no question that Germany will fundamentally transform, just that the process will take years. And this means that France and the UK, both first-rate military powers, will need to step up and do more. The UK has been aggressive in its support for Ukraine and reinforcing the eastern flank, but on the continent, France’s strategy will matter more. Europe will be well served if France decides whether it will play the collective European game on security or be an exceptionalist power tinkering with the idea of accommodating Russia within Europe.
Third, there is overwhelming recognition in the international community that Russia has violated Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are pillars of the modern international system. But the long shadow of western colonialism and racism along with the recent memory of western hectoring on politics and economy mean that not many outside the West feel sympathy for it or support its framing of the war as a fight between freedom and authoritarian imperialism. The remarks of western leaders from the Munich Security Conference reveal that they recognise that this is a problem. But the West will serve itself ill if it is apologetic and diffident about its values and vision of an international order as it reaches out to the Global South: They are the best game in town. It has almost stopped preaching. It must offer what China and Russia do to the world and it will likely have an edge. What it mustn’t do is compromise on the best version of itself.
Western regathering has meant that Putin’s war has carried over into a frustrating second year. It will intensify in the coming months and almost certainly cause further upscaling of western military assistance to Ukraine. The continent will feel a sharper security pinch as a result. The imperative is its transition back to being a serious security player. And that process hangs in the balance.
Atul Mishra teaches international politics at the Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence
The views expressed are personal
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