The concept of the Global South is slowly fraying
The idea of the Global South excites a lot of people. And this is a good reason to understand why the Global South has frayed after showing great promise.
As New Delhi’s multilateralism progresses apace, the Global South continues to feature prominently on its agenda. Having returned as an important element in India’s foreign policy after years, the idea excites a lot of people. And this is a good reason to understand why the Global South has frayed after showing great promise.
The Global South was a post-Cold War successor to the Third World idea. In academia, it was fashioned to convey a reforged relationship between territory and politics. While “South” indicated the tricontinental space of South America, Africa and Asia, “Global” foregrounded the fact that the twin forces of capitalism and western colonialism had shaped most of the world – in terms of both people and States – through a process marked by exclusion and inequality. Thus, the Global South was as much a worldwide condition of persisting disadvantages as it was a neat political geography. It could be represented by Havana and Harare; and it could be experienced in the underbellies of global cities, including those located in the West.
In international politics, the Global South began gathering substance in the early 2000s. It came to represent a desire of leading non-western states to make the extant world order, then being helmed by the West, less unequal and more representative and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the largest groupings of peoples and States. In the lead were Brazil, South Africa, India, China and Russia – a disparate bunch that was made coherent by a matrix of cross-cutting developments.
The primary source of their increasing leverage was the remarkable performance of their economies. Major changes were afoot in politics too. Across South America, a new Left galvanised the masses, pushing back against American influence and a variety of conservative elites that despised progressive policies. In South Africa, the political system had successfully handled the challenges of transition to a post-apartheid, post-white minority rule. Under Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, India was positioned as the largest and most successful example of a non-western liberal democracy. And while they were uneasy with the West, both China and Russia showed signs of pursuing a positive agenda of economic growth at home and cooperative development in partnership with the non-West. Together, these countries laid the foundations of a new southern multilateralism through groupings such as BRICS and IBSA.
These heartening developments were complemented by the modernisation and democratisation of South Asia – across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bhutan – while prospects of a lasting peace between India and Pakistan appeared nearer than they had been in a long time. The eruption of the Arab Spring held new hopes of indigenous democratisation of the Muslim world across Africa and West Asia. Progressive social movements linked issues of peace, environment, agriculture and financial equity: Recall the anti-globalisation and anti-Iraq war protests across the West as well as the various Occupy movements.
However, the idea began to fray in the 2010s because of multiple developments. The Arab Spring was taken down by authoritarianism and civil strife. The new Left was subverted in Brazil while it degenerated in Venezuela. South Asia saw reversals of its political gains, most notably in Afghanistan and in India-Pakistan relations. South Africa witnessed its challenges increase in the realms of economic growth, political stability, infrastructure and social cohesion. And there has been a steady erasure of liberalism in India’s domestic politics.
Above all, however, the idea of the Global South has been undermined by the rise of non-western geopolitics. Russia’s military and the Wagner mercenaries aggressively support authoritarian client regimes across Syria and Africa, often exploiting the anti-western sentiments and political chaos prevalent in the regions. China pedals its corrosive development model across the three continents, digging especially deep in Africa. And as evident from its role in the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, Beijing is keen to play the Great Power role that the United States has traditionally played in West Asia. The problem with these developments is that they clash with India’s vision, which seeks genuine stability and progress across the Global South, not least because it has traditionally understood that genuine postcolonial recovery requires a positive agenda rather than angry anti-westernism.
Signs of power machinations undoing the Global South are amply visible. Russian mercenaries and Indian peacekeepers appear to pursue contrasting goals in Africa. The development model that beggars India’s neighbours and destabilises South Asia is also confronted by New Delhi in Africa. Despite historical convergences with India, South Africa today inches closer to China. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has split opinion and narrowed diplomatic choice amongst the societies and States of the Global South. And three competing models are vying for allegiance and acceptability across an increasingly fractured construct.
India’s engagements with the postcolonial world have been driven by the recognition that solidarity amongst the ex-colonised is an imperative. It has traditionally balanced this imperative with the pursuit of its interests. There is no reason why this policy cannot continue to develop without the Global South appellation.
Atul Mishra teaches international relations at Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence
The views expressed are personal
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