The myth and reality of the SCO grouping
India recognises the group’s limitations, uses it for limited purposes and intends to work more closely with its real partners
It’s a messy international order. New friendships are being forged. Old rivalries are becoming more entrenched. Fault lines are blurred. Friends don’t always agree with each other. Adversaries are dependent on each other. And almost everyone is talking to almost everyone else irrespective of convergences and divergences.
It was this messiness that was on display last week in Delhi. India chaired the meeting of defence ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a grouping that includes Russia, China, Pakistan and four Central Asian countries. Iran and Belarus participated as observers.
Step back a moment to see what happened.
The Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, used the platform to launch a tirade against the West in general, and the United States (US) in particular. Besides hurling other allegations, Moscow said it was unhappy that the West was seeking to contain China and blamed the US for the intensification of tensions across the Taiwan Straits and in the South and East China Sea. Russia categorically mentioned Quad and AUKUS (the nuclear submarine pact between Australia, United Kingdom and US) as evidence of Washington creating blocs. And, of course, it blamed the US for the war in Ukraine.
Here is the problem. India probably disagrees with all of these positions articulated by Russia. It may need Moscow for its defence needs and it may have used the moment to import cheaper oil from Russia. But serious policymakers in Delhi are aware that Russia invaded Ukraine and Vladimir Putin crossed a line in February 2022. They are acutely conscious that the war has hurt Indian interests, including by pushing Moscow closer to Beijing and slowing down the global economy. And not only is India a key member of Quad, it privately believes that AUKUS is a useful addition to the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Delhi’s interest lies in the West taking a strong position against China, and if Washington has finally woken up to the threat posed by Beijing, that’s seen as the best piece of strategic news in Delhi’s power corridors.
Then turn to Chinese defence minister, Li Shangfu.
After his bilateral meeting with Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, the Chinese readout said that Beijing had made it clear that the situation at the border was “generally stable”. China told India that the two countries should take a “long-term view”, place the “border issue in an appropriate position”, and “promote the transition of the border situation to normalised management”. The two countries had more common interests than differences and should together contribute to “world and regional peace and stability”, Beijing insisted.
Here is the problem. Over 100,000 Peoples Liberation Army and Indian Army personnel are engaged in a direct face-off at the Line of Actual Control. China violated the core of the 1988 political understanding (let status quo persist at the border, let’s work on other issues) and every signed pact since then. It ramped up its presence at the border, intruded into territory that India considers its own, launched aggressive operations, engaged Indian troops in a bloody clash which killed soldiers in Galwan, and hasn’t disengaged from key friction points or de-escalated in general.
Delhi has consistently told Beijing that until peace and tranquillity is restored at the border, bilateral relations cannot go back to normal. Either China hasn’t got the import of the message or believes that India will have to live with a new status quo. India may not be shouting from the rooftops but Beijing is mistaken. There is a strategic consensus that China is the big adversary for the foreseeable future and no government will turn to business as usual even if it is careful about avoiding escalation. And as far as contributing together to regional stability is concerned, the rhetoric conveniently hides the fact that India, rightly, believes, that China is disproportionately contributing to instability. Delhi and Beijing are increasingly at opposing ends of the changed global security landscape.
And then there was Pakistan, represented by a special assistant to the Prime Minister, who, among other things, claimed that Pakistan was a “peace-loving country”. While Rajnath Singh delivered a strong message on need to counter terror and radicalisation, and even spoke of “strengthening the defence capacity” of SCO member-States for shared security interests, the fact is that these countries neither share security interests in common nor is Pakistan about to take on the Islamist terror machine it has created seriously.
So, what’s the point of the SCO?
Policymakers offer two arguments. The first is that being in the room is better than being outside. And that makes sense. Diplomacy involves engaging with all actors and using all platforms to make one’s own position heard. Just because India, as chair, offered a platform for views it doesn’t agree with is not a reason to dismiss the forum. But it is a reason to view it with scepticism.
The second argument goes back to a myth that has become a sacred belief in Indian foreign policy circles. This goes along the following lines. Delhi has strategic convergence with the West in the maritime domain but when it comes to the Asian continental landmass, the US is relatively absent and India has to do business with other actors. This is partly true, but what it misses is that India’s lack of direct geographical access to Central Asia and China’s growing influence in the region limits Delhi’s options. The SCO won’t necessarily enable a dramatic expansion of India’s ability to secure its interests in the region.
While a similar script will likely play out in the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting next week, and then the leaders’ level summit in July, India’s real diplomatic focus is on Quad, the engagement with the US, and the G20 summit, all of which are far more useful exercises.
If, in early March, Quad foreign ministers displayed remarkable bonhomie and advanced their common agenda in Delhi, Quad leaders will have their third summit in Australia in May. In late June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to the US for a State visit where both countries will advance cooperation on defence and critical and emerging technologies. And in September, India will host the G20 summit where it can showcase its achievements in digital public infrastructure, push the agenda of reform of multilateral development banks, hope to find ways to enhance climate collaboration, and seek to carve out a consensus on fractured times.
India’s leadership of the SCO shows its diplomatic adroitness and ability to engage with actors of different persuasions. But it is doing so while recognising the limits of the grouping, focusing on real partners, and being fully cognisant of the changing security landscape. Separating rhetoric from substance is the best way to understand the messiness of what happened last week.
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