Ukraine: The state of play after invasion
Putin may be relishing the gains of this perverse psychotherapy, but what stares him in the face is this: A concerted western attempt at his international isolation, degradation of Russia’s economy, and a steep decline in Russian power
‘Only [Vladimir] Putin knows the answer.” This was the standard response of western leaders when journalists asked them whether Russia would invade Ukraine. A full-scale invasion began at dawn on February 24 but the lack of clarity persists. We still do not know what the Russian president will settle at.
For weeks, it appeared that all Putin wanted was the West’s recognition and redressal of Russia’s security concerns. He did not want the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Ukraine: The country being large and geographically contiguous, it would have brought NATO considerably in towards to Russia. This was not an altogether illegitimate demand from a formidable military power and the world’s largest country, which lies on the borders of the mightiest military alliance in the world. Putin was ideologically distasteful to the West but here he had a point.
It is now clear that Putin wants much more. While announcing the invasion, he spoke of Ukraine’s “denazification” and “demilitarisation”, which implies a combination of regime decapitation and neutralisation of the Ukrainian armed forces. It would leave Ukraine hollowed out, a country only in name or with a puppet regime. What may follow if he succeeds remains unclear, but if the logic of his “historical” arguments is extended, Poland and the Baltic States may be next. These scenarios entail the destruction of Europe as we know it. There is no justification for them, and they recall German behaviour in its ascendant phase during World War II. The Europeans are alarmed and enraged for a reason.
It started on February 21, when Russia recognised as independent two breakaway “republics” in eastern Ukraine and announced it was sending military hardware and soldiers to “keep peace”. In the weeks prior, it seemed that Putin’s coercive diplomacy was paying off. He got leaders from Paris, London, and Berlin to visit him to work out a security deal. The French president prominently called for a new security and stability order in Europe. The German chancellor too seemed to be listening. The Americans fronted tough talk but were open to addressing Russia’s concerns. The West had begun to engage.
He got more. When it was claimed that Emmanuel Macron and Putin struck a deal, the Kremlin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov denied it. The British foreign secretary Liz Truss was apparently humiliated by her counterpart in Moscow. At the presser with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Putin got away with the claim that Ukraine was committing “genocide” in the Donbas region. The world was told Russian troops were withdrawing from Ukraine’s borders only to discover that their numbers had, in fact, increased by tens of thousands. Menacing war games flanked Ukraine. Putin agreed to a French-mediated summit with President Joe Biden but launched, within hours, the initial invasion in Ukraine’s east. And the attacks on Ukraine began as the Security Council was discussing the crisis.
All this sadistic playing with the West was about avenging Russia’s perceived humiliation and restoring its honour. It amounted to little material gain. But Putin would have everyone believe it mattered to the Russian psyche, which his revisionist history of the collapse of the Soviet Union claims was deeply scarred. He may be relishing the gains of this perverse psychotherapy, but what stares him in the face is this: A concerted western attempt at his international isolation, degradation of Russia’s economy, and a steep decline in Russian power.
What about the western response? Berating the West is easy but it is useful to remember that genuine democracies are slow strategic beasts. Nevertheless, the grouping has begun to respond seriously and in unison. Once considered obsolete and, by Donald Trump, a drain on American money, NATO has been revived. It has reinforced Ukraine’s western borders while its strategic posture is being revised. Putin has been told that all NATO territory remains inviolable and will be militarily defended. Further, as articulated by British prime minister Boris Johnson, there is recognition that going soft on Russia after Crimea’s annexation and not inducting Ukraine into NATO earlier were grave mistakes. This historical learning should aid major policy revisions within the West.
The western hope that the threat of sanctions would deter Putin is crushed. He made it clear on February 21 that he was fine with letting Russians suffer due to sanctions. Like any fine autocrat, Putin sees people’s suffering as an opportunity and thrives on packaging criticism and punishment meant for him as unjustified victimisation of his country. Nevertheless, unprecedented sanctions have been imposed. The aim is to weaken Russia enough that it does not aggress any further into Europe. It is too early to tell to what extent this strategy will succeed as it involves global coordination and economic costs distributed across continents and sectors, which may mar execution. Besides, sanctions on such a massive scale have never been imposed. But it is very likely that Russia and Putin have been put on a downhill path. For Putin personally, it is the beginning of the end.
Ukraine faces a loss of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. NATO will not get involved as that would bring four nuclear powers into confrontation. Putin has already issued a nuclear threat to the West. If an armed resistance follows after Kyiv is overwhelmed, the West will support it. But millions of Ukrainians have already begun suffering as Putin shows the best an autocrat is capable of. The trouble is that he is not the only one around with supposed historical grievances.
Atul Mishra teaches international relations at Shiv Nadar UniversityThe views expressed are personal
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