Ukraine war: A year on, no end in sight
The prospects for dialogue and diplomacy have never seemed more distant than they are now. This is because both sides, rightly or wrongly, are hopeful of military gains and have scores to settle
It is hard to believe, but almost a year has passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Naturally, it is painful to take stock of an event like this; nevertheless, it is important to assess where things are and where they are headed.
It is important to clarify the nature of the conflict in Ukraine. There is no question, in retrospect that Russia did invade Ukraine. But equally, it must be conceded, even by Russia’s worst critics, that this was not an unprovoked aggression. The West provoked Russia, and it reacted militarily to the situation. As it may, Russia’s actions are unjustified and condemnable from the perspective of the United Nations/international law and global public opinion.
Since Russia started the conflict in Ukraine, it is reasonable to ask whether its original war objectives have been achieved wholly or substantially. Russia’s stated objectives were to “de-Nazify” and “de-militarise” Ukraine, to ensure Ukraine’s neutrality, to liberate Donbas and to have a friendly regime in Kyiv. After a year of hostilities, Russia has achieved none of the above objectives in full. Indeed, the exact opposite has happened in some cases, such as ensuring Ukraine’s neutrality. Ukraine seems sure to join the European Union (EU) sooner or later. Ukraine may not join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) soon, but is developing close ties. And Nato admitting Finland and Sweden as full members cannot but be considered a strategic setback for Russia.
This does not suggest that Ukraine has emerged a clear winner from the war. Ukraine losing at least 100,000 lives is not the same as Russia losing the same number of people. Ukraine is a much smaller country than Russia, with limited military personnel available over the medium to long term. It is undeniable that Ukrainians have displayed grit and determination in resisting Russian aggression. But it is highly doubtful whether that alone will enable them to win the war.
Even the current situation is attributable, in no small measure, to the massive financial and military assistance (estimated at $100 billion so far) that Ukraine is getting from the United States (US) and the EU. Despite this, Russia is not denying occupying something like 20% of Ukraine’s territory. And in spite of all speculation to the contrary, Russia’s economy has not collapsed, and Vladimir Putin is not about to be overthrown tomorrow.
It is fair to describe the current military situation as a “frozen war” characterised by a stalemate. But that may not prevent both sides from preparing for a military offensive to gain the upper hand. Russia has mobilised many troops and is expected to launch a spring offensive in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s military objective would be to control the four “oblasts” ---- Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, which it annexed in September 2022. From the Russian perspective, Crimea appears non-negotiable. Any attempt to change the status quo by Ukraine by blocking access to Crimea for Russia could lead to a wider war with unpredictable consequences.
From Ukraine’s perspective, any offensive has to be about retrieving the land lost to Russia, which is easier said than done. However, Ukraine has convinced the West that heavy battle tanks are necessary for this purpose, hence the commitment to supply Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks by Germany and US, respectively.
Not satisfied with this, Ukraine is now pushing for F16 fighter aircraft and for long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). If Ukraine obtains this, the war will move into a higher gear altogether. The above weapons can be used to hit targets well within Russia, and the latter cannot be expected to sit idly by if this were to happen. It is then a matter of time before it becomes an overt Russia-NATO war rather than the proxy war it is now.
The prospects for dialogue and diplomacy have never seemed more distant than they are now. This is because both sides, rightly or wrongly, are hopeful of military gains and have scores to settle. Yet, a number of reports suggest that a decisive military victory is difficult, if not impossible, for either side. There are credible reasons to believe the West is disinclined for dialogue and diplomacy at this stage.
No less an entity than RAND Corporation came up with a policy paper dated January (Avoiding a Long War). The thrust of this paper, counterintuitively, serves as a warning that the United States interests would best be served by avoiding a protracted conflict and that the costs and risks of a long war in Ukraine are significant and outweigh any benefits. Indeed, the RAND paper highlights four policy instruments the US could use: Clarifying plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding Ukraine’s neutrality and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.
Surprisingly, RAND Corporation has come up with this paper advocating dialogue and diplomacy to end the conflict. The point is that a protracted battle in Ukraine is in no one’s interest. The question is: Are there any takers for this line of thinking in the West, especially the US and the EU, and is there any country (or a group of countries) which can act as an honest broker with both parties to encourage them to come to the table for talks?
Mohan Kumar is a former ambassador and dean/professor at OP Jindal Global University.
The views expressed are personal