What’s behind Europe’s balancing act with China?

Given Europe’s prevarication and desire to protect its interests in China, it is hard to avoid the impression that for now, China holds most of the cards.

The long list of European leaders who have visited China in the last four months may well convince the average person that the Middle Kingdom is the only place that matters to Europe. How else does one explain the appearances by German chancellor Olof Scholz, European Union (EU) Council President Charles Michel, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and recently, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen?

A flurry of visits from the EU serves to burnish Xi’s foreign policy credentials, coming as it does soon after his visit to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin. (Reuters)

It is obvious that the EU is keen to underline that its policy of engagement with China is independent of its transatlantic partner, the United States (US). So, while the US and China are struggling to resume their bilateral dialogue at a meaningful level, almost everyone in the EU is merrily winging their way to China for a meeting.

Second, whether overtly or subliminally, European decision-makers do not share the American policy of decoupling with China. Many European countries have close economic and trade ties with China, and they have no desire to cut those off.

Third, the Europeans believe China has an important role to play in the Ukrainian end game. And they have higher stakes in Ukraine than anyone else. Their belief must have been bolstered by a phone call between Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelensky this week — where the Chinese president reportedly told his Ukrainian counterpart that talks and negotiations were the only way forward. This Chinese move has been welcomed by all stakeholders without exception.

Lastly, there is the small matter of the presidential elections in the US next year. What if the Republicans take the White House? It is a contingency the Europeans would like to be prepared for. For Europe, the existential threat is from Russia. True, the EU shares concerns about the rise of an assertive China, but it thinks this can and should be managed through a sustained process of bilateral engagement at all levels. The EU prefers a process of de-risking, not decoupling, which means that while the EU’s dependence on China for some strategic sectors (think semiconductors, rare earth minerals) must be reduced, the rest of the trade and investment relationship is kosher and must be pursued and strengthened. Europe is also mortally afraid of China joining hands with Russia in a way that allows the former to supply lethal weapons and provide military aid to Russia, which will completely alter the war dynamic in Ukraine. Indeed, Europe’s immediate preoccupation is about two things: The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia and the interdiction of lethal weapons supply from China to Russia. For now, China seems content to go along with these propositions.

From China’s perspective, all this is a bonanza. A flurry of visits from the EU serves to burnish Xi’s foreign policy credentials, coming as it does soon after his visit to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin. China would also love to drive a wedge between the US and Europe. In this vein, China has always hectored EU leaders that they must follow an independent foreign policy. Macron’s recent interview where he propounded his theory of strategic autonomy for Europe appears to have riled both the Europeans and Americans alike. But the fact is he was articulating France’s established thinking from the time of Charles de Gaulle. But France’s view is not necessarily shared by others in Europe, particularly countries such as Poland. It is also undeniable that without support from the US, Ukraine could not have held up against the Russian invasion. So, Europe’s strategic autonomy for now is a theoretical construct. Meanwhile, the “no-limits” friendship between Russia and China does appear to have some limits. For one thing, the Chinese ambassador to the EU, Fu Cong, suggested that China was not necessarily on Russia’s side in the war in Ukraine and added for good measure that the reference to “no-limits” in the Sino-Russian joint statement of February 4, 2022, was “nothing but rhetoric”. Also, on the Chinese offer of mediation and Ukraine saying they will be open to negotiations on Crimea, Russia was quick to pour cold water by saying that they were not ready for negotiations on Crimea.

Given Europe’s prevarication and desire to protect its economic and geopolitical interests in China, and Xi’s growing international profile, it is hard to avoid the impression that for now, at least in the context of Europe and the Eurasian conflict, China holds most, if not all, the cards.

Mohan Kumar is a former Indian ambassador to France and dean/professor, OP Jindal Global University

The views expressed are personal