When Mandal 2.0 gets to confront Hindutva

Indian politics have changed for the Mandal-Kamandal binary to play out as it did in the past. The fault line today is unequal economic growth

The publication of the Bihar caste survey results and its finding that the other backward classes (OBC) have a share of 63% of the state’s population has given a big boost to the demand for a nationwide caste census and increasing the OBC quota from the current 27% to their proportionate share in the population. Will this be a game changer in the next general election, which is just about six months away? Chanakya is well aware of the hazards of predicting political outcomes in the diverse and multi-layered arena that Indian democracy is. But here are three questions that will determine what happens.

The implementation of Mandal Commission recommendations was among the most polarising moments in post-independent India. (HT)

One, can the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) remain non-committal on the caste census demand without hurting its appeal to the OBCs?

One development that has facilitated the BJP’s rise as the hegemon in Indian politics after 2014 is its transformation from a Brahmin-Baniya party to a fortified block of upper castes, non-dominant OBCs, even Dalit Hindus. This block constitutes almost 60% of India’s electorate. The BJP never lets go of an opportunity to brandish its newfound social coalition. Comments by senior party leaders in the recently concluded special Parliament session that the BJP has more OBC Members of Parliament (MPs) than all of the Congress MPs put together are just one example of this.

Two, can the BJP retain its strong OBC credentials without coming clear on the demand for a caste census and proportionate reservations when the entire Opposition is demanding it? Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s recent speeches suggest that the BJP could try and do this, but the signs are that it may not be easy to pull off.

Of course, the BJP has a plan B in the form of tying proportionate reservations with the yet-to-be-published Rohini Commission recommendations. The Commission’s recommendations could pit dominant OBCs against lower OBCs. But this strategy risks significant social and political disruption, which is not a desirable proposition for a ruling party.

The BJP’s first litmus test on this front will be to make sure that its caste-based regional party allies do not break ranks ahead of the 2024 polls. Having said this, it needs to be underlined that such small parties are more likely to behave as satellites to the existing political hegemon than commit themselves to a protracted struggle for social transformation.

Three, can a caste census and proportionate reservations be the elusive silver bullet for the Opposition? While a rainbow Hindu coalition is extremely crucial for the BJP’s political fortunes, the way it has been achieved is not the same as the Mandal playbook. While representation and strategic othering of dominant castes in leadership positions (especially chief ministers in key states) has been a characteristic feature of the BJP’s political strategy post-2014, it has also used the tropes of cultural nationalism, communal polarisation, welfare and the larger-than-life image of PM Modi as a nation-builder par excellence to drive home its political message.

While there is a bipartisan consensus on the welfare (or freebies) route to political power, it remains to be seen whether the promise of increased reservations alone will be sufficient for a significant section of the BJP’s voter base to shift to the Opposition. There is good reason to argue that the Opposition is divided on this matter. The recent controversy about Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam leader Udhayanidhi Stalin’s comments on the Sanatana Dharma and the visible discomfort of opposition parties outside the Dravidian fold is a good example of this.

Of course, it also remains to be seen whether outfits such as the Aam Aadmi Party or Trinamool Congress are willing to ratchet up the rhetoric on a caste census and proportionate reservations. None of these contradictions will matter if the Opposition manages to portray the BJP as a political force opposed to increasing OBC reservations. The Bihar elections of 2015 are a good example of what an OBC backlash can do to the BJP.

The implementation of Mandal Commission recommendations was among the most polarising moments in post-independent India. However, with the courts upholding both Mandal 1.0 and Mandal 2.0, there is now widespread recognition of the fact that OBC reservations are here to stay. This political reality along with the fact that the best economic opportunities are now in the private sector has lowered the stakes for the upper caste elite to invest in anti-reservation politics.

Besides, if at all proportionate reservations are implemented, it is likely to be accompanied by a concomitant increase in seats in educational institutions as it happened after Mandal 1, leaving the number of unreserved seats intact and thus offering an olive branch to the communities that are not eligible for reservations. There is also the possibility that a large number of young voters even in the ranks of the OBCs in northern states have realised that it makes more sense to use migration as an engine of upward economic mobility rather than join the ranks of foot soldiers for the cause of increasing reservations.

An analysis published in this newspaper has shown that the average incomes of Scheduled Caste households in Tamil Nadu are higher than the earnings of an average upper caste household in Uttar Pradesh (UP) or Bihar. On this front, the Mandal parties might be guilty of making the same mistake twice. While social justice politics did break oppressive structures of feudal dominance in states such as UP and Bihar, it failed to exploit the crucial window when economic reforms started. This failure has contributed greatly to the continuing economic backwardness of these states. To be sure, it needs to be underlined that the economic success of southern states must not be seen as the triumph of the market. It is social reform and equality delivered by social justice movements that have provided the broader base for capitalist growth in these regions.

That said, democratic regimes need to ensure that their policy paradigm does not end up destroying their political capital. It is the ability to strike this balance which makes the difference between hegemonic and transient political forces.

What gives the BJP an edge is that its policy paradigm of big capital-led growth and welfare-driven popular support has the insurance of political Hindutva. Is the Opposition trying to replicate the same policy paradigm with an insurance from an OBC rather than a Hindu majority? Irrespective of whether this succeeds or not, the fact remains that the central fault line, as far as India’s future is concerned, is its failure to make growth more broad-based rather than address it with Mandal or Kamandal.